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Abstract
We study the problem of answering a workload of linear queries Q, on a database of size at most
n = o(|Q|) drawn from a universe U under the constraint of (approximate) differential privacy. Nikolov,
Talwar, and Zhang [NTZ13] proposed an efficient mechanism that, for any given Q and n, answers the
queries with average error that is at most a factor polynomial in log |Q| and log |U| worse than the best
possible. Here we improve on this guarantee and give a mechanism whose competitiveness ratio is at
most polynomial in log n and log |U|, and has no dependence on |Q|. Our mechanism is based on the
projection mechanism of [NTZ13], but in place of an ad-hoc noise distribution, we use a distribution
which is in a sense optimal for the projection mechanism, and analyze it using convex duality and the
restricted invertibility principle.
1 Introduction
The central problem of private data analysis is to characterize to what extent it is possible to compute useful
information from statistical data without compromising the privacy of the individuals represented in the
dataset. In order to formulate this problem precisely, we need a database model and a definition of what it
means to preserve privacy. Following prior work, we model a database as a multiset D of n elements from a
universe U , with each database element specifying the data of a single individual. Defining privacy is more
subtle. A definition which has received considerable attention in recent years is differential privacy, which
postulates that a randomized algorithm preserves privacy if its distribution on outputs is almost the same
(in an appropriate metric) on any two input databases D and D′ that differ in the data of at most a single
individual. The formal definition is as follows:
Definition 1.1 ([DMNS06]). Two databases D and D′ are neighboring if the size of their symmetric differ-
ence is at most one. A randomized algorithm M satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy if for any two neighboring
databases D and D′ and any measurable event S in the range of M,
P[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεP[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
Differential privacy has a number of desirable properties: it is invariant under post-processing, the privacy
loss degrades smoothly under (possibly adaptive) composition, and the privacy guarantees hold in the face
of arbitrary side information. We will adopt it as our definition of choice in this paper. We will work in the
regime δ > 0, which is often called approximate differential privacy, to distinguish it from pure differential
privacy, which is the case δ = 0. Approximate differential privacy provides strong semantic guarantees when
δ is n−ω(1): roughly speaking, it implies that with probability at least 1− O(n
√
δ), an arbitrarily informed
adversary cannot guess from the output of the algorithm if any particular user is represented in the database.
See [GKS08] for a precise formulation of this semantic guarantee.
We then turn to the question of understanding the constraints imposed by privacy on the kinds of
computation we can perform. We focus on computing answers to a fundamental class of database queries:
the linear queries, which generalize counting queries. A counting query counts the number of database
elements that satisfy a given predicate; a linear query allows for weighted counts. Formally, a linear query is
specified by a function q : U → R (q : U → {0, 1} in the case of counting queries); slightly abusing notation,
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we define the value of the query as q(D) ,
∑
e∈D q(e) (elements of D are counted with multiplicity). We
call a set Q of linear queries a workload, and an algorithm that answers a query workload a mechanism.
Since the work of Dinur and Nissim [DN03], it has been known that answering queries too accurately
can lead to very dramatic privacy breaches, and this is true even for counting queries. For example,
in [DN03, DMT07] it was shown that answering Ω(n) random counting queries with error per query o(
√
n)
allows an adversary to reconstruct a very accurate representation of a database of size n, which contra-
dicts any reasonable privacy notion. On the other hand, a simple mechanism that adds independent
Gaussian noise to each query answer achieves (ε, δ)-differential privacy and answers any set Q of count-
ing queries with average error O(
√
|Q|) [DN03, DN04, DMNS06].1 While this is a useful guarantee for a
small number of queries, it quickly loses value when |Q| is much larger than the database size, and be-
comes trivial for ω(n2) queries. Nevetheless, since the seminal paper of Blum, Ligett and Roth [BLR08], a
long line of work [DNR+09, DRV10, RR10, HR10, GHRU11, HLM12, GRU12] has shown that even when
|Q| = ω(n), more sophisticated private mechanisms can achieve error not much larger than O(√n). For
instance, there exist (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms for linear queries that acheive average error
O(
√
n log1/4 |U|) [GRU12]. There are sets of counting queries for which this bound is tight up to factors
polylogarithmic in the size of the database [BUV13].
Specific query workloads allow for error which is much better than the worst-case bounds. Some nat-
ural examples are queries counting the number of points in a line interval or a d-dimensional axis-aligned
box [DNPR10, CSS10, XWG10], or a d-dimensional halfspace [MN12]. It is, therefore, desirable to have
mechanisms whose error bounds adapt both to the query workload and to the database size. In particu-
lar, if opt(n,Q) is the best possible average error2 achievable under differential privacy for the workload
Q on databases of size at most n, we would like to have a mechanism with error at most a small fac-
tor larger than opt(n,Q) for any n and Q. The first result of this type is due to Nikolov, Talwar, and
Zhang [NTZ13], who presented a mechanism running in time polynomial in |U|, |Q|, and n, with error at
most polylog(|Q|, |U|) · opt(n,Q).
Here we improve the results from [NTZ13]:
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). There exists a mechanism that, given a database of size n drawn from a universe
U , and a workload Q of linear queries, runs in time polynomial in |U|, |Q| and n, and has average error per
query at most polylog(n, |U|) · opt(n,Q).
Notice that the competitiveness ratio in Theorem 1.1 is independent of the number of queries, which can
be significantly larger than both n and |U|. This type of guarantee is easier to prove when n = Ω(|Q|),
because in that case there exist nearly optimal mechanisms that are oblivious of the database size [NTZ13].
Therefore, we focus on the more challenging regime of small databases, i.e. n = o(|Q|).
It is worth making a couple of remarks about the strength of Theorem 1.1. First, in many applications
the queries in Q are represented compactly rather than by a truth table, and |U| is exponentially large in
the size of a natural representation of the input. In such cases, running time bounds which are polynomial
in |U| may be prohibitive. Nevertheless, our work still gives interesting information theoretic bounds on the
optimal error, and, moreover, our mechanism can be a starting point for developing more efficient variants.
Furthermore, under a plausible complexity theoretic hypothesis, our running time guarantee is the best one
can hope for without making further assumptions on Q [Ull13]. A second remark is that our optimal error
guarantees are in terms of average error, while many papers in the literature consider worst-case error.
Proving a result analogous to Theorem 1.1 for worst-case error remains an interesting open problem.
Techniques. Following the ideas of [NTZ13], our starting point is a generalization of the well-known
Gaussian noise mechanism, which adds appropriately scaled correlated Gaussian noise to the queries. By
itself, this mechanism is sufficient to guarantee privacy, but its error is too large when n = o(|Q|). The
main insight of [NTZ13] was to use the knowledge that the database is small to reduce the error via a post-
processing step. The post-processing is a form of regression: we find the vector of answers that is closest to
the noisy answers while still consistent with the database size bound. (In fact the estimator is slightly more
complicated and related to the hybrid estimator of Zhang [Zha13].) Intuitively, when n is small compared
to the number of queries, this regression step cancels a significant fraction of the error.
1Here and in the remainder of the introduction we ignore dependence of the error on ε and δ.
2We give a formal definition later.
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Our first novel contribution is to analyze the error of this mechanism for arbitrary noise distributions
and formulate it as a convex function of the covariance matrix of the noise. Then we write a convex program
that captures the problem of finding the covariance matrix for which the performance of the mechanism is
optimized on the given query workload and database size bound. We use Gaussian noise with this optimal
covariance in place of the recursively constructed ad-hoc noise distribution3 from [NTZ13]. Finally, we
relate the dual of the convex program to a spectral lower bound on opt(n,Q) via the restricted invertibility
principle of Bourgain and Tzafriri [BT87]. We stress that while the restricted invertibility principle was used
in [NTZ13] as well, here we need a new argument which works for the optimal covariance matrix we compute
and gives a smaller competitiveness ratio.
In addition to the improvement in the competitiveness ratio, our approach here is more direct and we
believe it gives a better understanding of the performance of the regression-based mechanism for small
databases.
2 Preliminaries
We use capital letters for matrices and lower-case letters for vectors and scalars. We use 〈·, ·〉 for the standard
inner product between vectors in Rn. For a matrixM ∈ Rm×n and a set S ⊆ [n], we useMS for the submatrix
consisting of the columns of A indexed by elements of S. We use the notation M ≻ 0 to denote that M is
a positive definite matrix, and M  0 to denote that it is positive semidefinite. We use σmin(M) for the
smallest singular value of M , i.e. σmin(M) , minx ‖Mx‖2/‖x‖2. We use tr(·) for the trace operator, and
‖M‖2 for the ℓ2 → ℓ2 operator norm of M , i.e. ‖M‖2 , maxx ‖Mx‖2/‖x‖2.
The distribution of a multivariate Gaussian with mean µ and covariance Σ is denoted N(µ,Σ).
2.1 Histograms, the Query Matrix, and the Sensitivity Polytope
It will be convenient to encode the problem of releasing answers to linear queries using linear-algebraic
notation. A common and very useful representation of a database D is the histogram representation: the
histogram of D is a vector x ∈ RU such that for any e ∈ U , xe is equal to the number of copies of e in D.
Notice that ‖x‖1 = n and also that if x and x′ are respectively the histograms of two neighboring databases
D and D′, then ‖x − x′‖1 ≤ 1 (here ‖x‖1 =
∑
e |xe| is the standard ℓ1 norm). Linear queries are a linear
transformation of x. More concretely, let us define the query matrix A ∈ RQ×U associated with a set of
linear queries Q by aq,e = q(e). Then it is easy to see that the vector Ax gives the answers to the queries Q
on a database D with histogram x.
Since this does not lead to any loss in generality, for the remainder of this chapter we will assume that
databases are given to mechanisms as histograms, and workloads of linear queries are given as query matrices.
We will identify the space of size-n databases with histograms in the scaled ℓ1 ball nB
U
1 , {x ∈ RU : ‖x‖1 ≤
n}, and we will identify neighboring databases with histograms x, x′ such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ 1.
The sensitivity polytope KA of a query matrix A ∈ RQ×U is the convex hull of the columns of A and the
columns of −A. Equivalently, KA , ABU1 , i.e. the image of the unit ℓ1 ball in RU under multiplication by A.
Notice that nKA = {Ax : ‖x‖1 ≤ n} is the symmetric convex hull4 of the possible vectors of query answers
to the queries in Q on databases of size at most n.
2.2 Measures of Error and the Spectral Lower Bound
As our basic notion of error we will consider mean squared error. For a mechanismM and a subset X ⊆ RU ,
let us define the error with respect to the query matrix A ∈ RQ×U as
err(M, X,A) , sup
x∈X
(
E
1
|Q|‖Ax−M(A, x)‖
2
2
)1/2
.
3The distribution in [NTZ13] is independent of the database size bound. This could be a reason why their guarantees scale
with log |Q| rather than logn.
4The symmetric convex hull of a set of points v1, . . . , vN is equal to the convex hull of ±v1, . . . ,±vN .
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where the expectation is taken over the random coins ofM. We also write err(M, nBU1 , A) as err(M, n, A).
The optimal error achievable by any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism for the query matrix A and
databases of size up to n is
optε,δ(n,A) , infM
err(M, n, A),
where the infimum is taken over all (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms M.
Arguing directly about optε,δ(n,A) appears difficult. For this reason we use the following spectral lower
bound from [NTZ13]. This lower bound was implicit in previous papers, for example [KRSU10].
Theorem 2.1 ([NTZ13]). There exists a constant c such that for any query matrix A ∈ RQ×U , any small
enough ε, and any δ small enough with respect to ε, optε,δ(n,A) ≥ (c/ε) SpecLB(εn,A), where
SpecLB(k,A) , max
S⊆U
|S|≤k
√
k/|Q| σmin(AS).
2.3 Composition and the Gaussian Mechanism
An important basic property of differential privacy is that the privacy guarantees degrade smoothly under
composition and are not affected by post-processing.
Lemma 2.1.1 ([DMNS06, DKM+06]). Let M1(·) satisfy (ε1, δ1)-differential privacy, and M2(x, ·) satisfy
(ε2, δ2)-differential privacy for any fixed x. Then the mechanism M2(M1(D), D) satisfies (ε1 + ε2, δ1+ δ2)-
differential privacy.
A basic method to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy is the Gaussian mechanism. We use the following
generalized variant, introduced in [NTZ13].
Theorem 2.2 ([DN03, DN04, DMNS06, NTZ13]). Let Q be a set of queries with query matrix A, and let
Σ ∈ RQ×Q, Σ ≻ 0, be such that aTe Σ−1ae ≤ 1 for all columns ae of A. Then the mechanism MΣ(A, x) =
Ax+ w where w ∼ N(0, c2ε,δΣ) and cε,δ ,
0.5
√
ε+
√
2 ln(1/δ)
ε satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
3 The Projection Mechanism
A key element in our mechanism is the use of least squares estimation to reduce error on small databases. In
this section we introduce and analyze a mechanism based on least squares estimation, similar to the hybrid
estimator of [Zha13]. Essentially the same mechanism was used in [NTZ13], but the definition and analysis
were tied to a particular noise distribution.
Algorithm 1 Projection Mechanism MprojΣ
Input: (Public) Query matrix A ∈ RQ×U ; matrix Σ ≻ 0 such that a⊺eΣ−1ae ≤ for all columns ae of A.
Input: (Private) Histogram x of a database of size ‖x‖1 ≤ n.
1: Run the generalized Gaussian mechanism (Theorem 2.2) to compute y˜ ,MΣ(A, x);
2: Let Π be the orthogonal projection operator onto the span of the eigenvectors corresponding to the ⌊εn⌋
largest eigenvalues of Σ
3: Compute y¯ ∈ n(I −Π)KA, where KA is the sensitivity polytope of A, and y¯ is
y¯ = argmin{‖z − (I −Π)y˜‖22 : z ∈ n(I −Π)KA}.
Output: Vector of answers Πy˜ + y¯.
As shown in [NTZ13, DNT14], Algorithm 1 can be efficiently implemented using the ellipsoid algorithm
or the Frank-Wolfe algorithm.
To analyze the error of the Projection Mechanism, we use the following key lemma, which appears
to be standard in statistics (we refer to [NTZ13, DNT14] for a proof). Recall that for a convex body
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(compact convex set with non-empty interior) L ⊆ Rm, the Minkowski norm (gauge function) is defined
by ‖x‖L , min{r : x ∈ rL} for any x ∈ Rm. The polar body is L◦ , {y : 〈y, x〉 ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ L} and the
corresponding norm is also equal to the support function of L: ‖y‖L◦ , max{〈y, x〉 : x ∈ L}. When L is
symmetric around 0 (i.e. −L = L), the Minkowski norm and support function are both norms in the usual
sense.
Lemma 3.0.1 ([NTZ13, DNT14]). Let L ⊆ Rm be a symmetric convex body, and let y ∈ L, y˜ ∈ Rm. Let,
finally, y¯ = argmin{‖z − y˜‖22 : z ∈ L}. We have ‖y¯ − y‖22 ≤ 4min{‖y˜ − y‖22, ‖y˜ − y‖L◦}.
The next lemma gives our analysis of the error of the Projection Mechanism.
Lemma 3.0.2. Assume Σ ≻ 0 is such that a⊺eΣ−1ae ≤ 1 for all columns ae of A. Then the Projection
Mechanism MprojΣ in Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Moreover, for ε = O(1),
err(MprojΣ , n, A) = O
((
1 +
√
log |U|√
log 1/δ
)1/2)
·
(c2ε,δ
|Q|
∑
i≤εn
σi
)1/2
,
where σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ . . . ≥ σ|Q| are the eigenvalues of Σ.
Proof. To prove the privacy guarantee, observe that the output of MprojΣ (A, x) is just a post-processing of
the output of MΣ(A, x), i.e. the algorithm does not access x except to pass it to MΣ(A, x). The privacy
then follows from Theorem 2.2 and Lemma 2.1.1.
Next we bound the error. Let y , Ax be the true answers to the queries, and let w , y˜−y ∼ N(0, c2ε,δΣ)
be the random noise introduced by the generalized Gaussian mechanism. By the Pythagorean theorem and
linearity of expectation, the expected total squared error of the projection mechanism is
E‖Πy˜ + y¯ − y‖22 = E‖Πy˜ −Πy‖22 + E‖y¯ − (I −Π)y‖22.
Above and in the remainder of the proof expectations are taken with respect to the randomness in the choice
of w. We bound the two terms on the right hand side separately. We will show:
E‖Πy˜ −Πy‖22 = c2ε,δ
k∑
i=1
σi, (1)
E‖y¯ − (I −Π)y‖22 = O
(√
log |U|√
log 1/δ
)
c2ε,δ
k∑
i=1
σi. (2)
(1) and (2) together imply the error bound in the theorem.
To prove (1), observe that Πy˜ − Πy = Πw ∼ N(0, c2ε,δΠΣΠ). By the definition of Π, the non-zero
eigenvalues of ΠΣΠ are σ1, . . . , σk where k , ⌊εn⌋. We have
E‖Πy˜ −Πy‖22 = c2ε,δtr(ΠΣΠ) = c2ε,δ
k∑
i=1
σi.
To prove (2) we appeal to Lemma 3.0.1. Define K˜ , (I −Π)KA. With nK˜ in the place of L, the lemma
implies that
E‖y¯ − (I −Π)y‖22 ≤ 4E‖(I −Π)w‖(nK˜)◦ = 4nE‖(I −Π)w‖K˜◦ , (3)
where we used the simple fact
‖(I −Π)w‖(nK˜)◦ = sup
z∈nK˜
〈(I −Π)w, z〉 = n sup
z∈K˜
〈(I −Π)w, z〉 = n‖(I −Π)w‖K˜◦ .
K˜ is the convex hull of the columns of (I − Π)A and the columns of −(I − Π)A. For any such column
(I −Π)ae we have
1 ≥ a⊺eΣ−1ae ≥ a⊺e(I −Π)Σ−1(I −Π)ae ≥ σ−1k+1a⊺e(I −Π)ae.
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The first inequality is by the assumption on Σ; the second follows because Σ−1 − (I − Π)Σ−1(I − Π)  0;
the third inequality is due to the fact that the smallest eigenvalue of (I − Π)Σ−1(I − Π) restricted to the
range of I − Π is σ−1k+1 by the choice of Π. Therefore, ‖(I − Π)ae‖22 ≤ σk+1 ≤ σk. Since a linear functional
attains its maximum value over a polytope at a vertex, we have ‖(I − Π)w‖K˜◦ = supz∈K˜ 〈(I −Π)w, z〉 =
maxe∈U |〈(I −Π)w, ae〉|. Each inner product 〈(I − Π)w, ae〉 is a centered Gaussian random variable with
variance E〈(I − Π)w, ae〉2 = c2ε,δa⊺e(I − Π)Σ(I − Π)ae. By the choice of Π, the largest eigenvalue of (I −
Π)Σ(I − Π) is σk+1 ≤ σk. From this fact and the inequality ‖(I − Π)ae‖22 ≤ σk, we have that the variance
of 〈(I −Π)w, ae〉 is at most c2ε,δσ2k. By a standard concentration argument, we can bound the expectation of
the maximum absolute value of the inner products as
E‖(I −Π)w‖K˜◦ = Emaxe∈U |〈(I −Π)w, ae〉| = O(
√
log |U|)cε,δσk.
Plugging this into (3), we get
E‖y¯ − (I −Π)y‖22 = O(
√
log |U|)cε,δnσk.
To show that this implies (2), observe that, by averaging, cε,δnσk ≤ cε,δnk
∑k
i=1 σi. Since k = ⌊εn⌋, cε,δnk =
O
(
c2ε,δ√
log 1/δ
)
. This finishes the proof of (2), and, therefore, of the theorem.
4 Optimality of the Projection Mechanism
In this section we show that we can choose a covariance matrix Σ so that MprojΣ has nearly optimal error:
Theorem 4.1. Let ε be a small enough constant and let δ = |U|o(1) be small enough with respect to ε. For
any query matrix A ∈ RQ×U , and any database size bound n, there exists a covariance matrix Σ ≻ 0 such
that the Projection Mechanism MprojΣ in Algorithm 1 is (ε, δ)-differentially private and has error
err(M, n, A) = O((log n)(log 1/δ)1/4(log |U|)1/4) · 1
ε
SpecLB(εn,A)
= O((log n)(log 1/δ)1/4(log |U|)1/4) · optε,δ(n,A)
Moreover, Σ can be computed in time polynomial in |Q|.
Theorem 4.1 is the formal statement of Theorem 1.1. (Recall again that Algorithm 1 can be implemented
in time polynomial in n, |Q| and |U|, as shown in [NTZ13, DNT14].)
To prove the theorem, we optimize over the choices of Σ that ensure (ε, δ)-differential privacy, and use
convex duality and the restricted invertibility principle to relate the optimal covariance to the spectral lower
bound.
4.1 Minimizing the Ky Fan Norm
Recall that for an m×m matrix Σ ≻ 0 with eigenvalues σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ . . . ≥ σm, and a positive integer k ≤ m,
the Ky Fan k-norm is defined as ‖Σ‖(k) , σ1 + . . .+ σk. The covariance matrix Σ we use in the projection
mechanism will be the one achieving min{‖Σ‖(k) : a⊺eΣ−1ae ≤ 1 ∀e ∈ U}, where ae is the column of the
query matrix A associated with the universe element e. This choice is directly motivated by Lemma 3.0.2.
We can write this optimization problem in the following way.
Minimize ‖X−1‖(k) s.t. (4)
X ≻ 0 (5)
∀e ∈ U : a⊺eXae ≤ 1. (6)
The program above has a geometric meaning. For a positive definite matrix X , the set E(X) , {v ∈ RQ :
v⊺Xv} is an ellipsoid centered at the origin. The constraint (6) means that E(X) has to contain all columns
of the query matrix A. The objective function (4) is equal to the sum of squared lengths of the k longest
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major axes of E(X). Therefore, we are looking for the smallest ellipsoid centered at the origin that contains
the columns of A, where the “size” of the ellipsoid is the sum of squared lengths of the k longest major axes.
We will not use this geometric interpretation in the rest of the paper.
We will show that (4)–(6) is a convex optimization problem. This will allow us to use general tools such
as the ellipsoid method to find an optimal solution, and also to use duality theory in order to analyze the
value of the optimal solution.
To show that (4)–(6) is convex we will need the following well-known result of Fan.
Lemma 4.1.1 ([Fan49]). For any m×m real symmetric matrix Σ,
‖Σ‖(k) = max
U∈Rm×k:U⊺U=I
tr(U⊺ΣU).
With this result in hand, we can prove that (4)–(6) is a convex optimization problem.
Lemma 4.1.2. The objective function (4) and constraints (6) are convex over X ≻ 0.
Proof. The objective function and the constraints (6) are affine, and therefore convex. It remains to show that
the objective (4) is also convex. Let X1 and X2 be two feasible solutions and define Y = αX1+(1−α)X2 for
some α ∈ [0, 1]. Because the matrix inverse is operator convex (see e.g. [Bha97]), Y −1  αX−11 +(1−α)X−12 .
Let U ∈ Rm×k be such that tr(U⊺Y −1U) = ‖Y −1‖(k) and U⊺U = I. Such a U exists by by Lemma 4.1.1.
We have, again using Lemma 4.1.1,
‖Y −1‖(k) = tr(U⊺Y −1U) ≤ αtr(U⊺X−11 U) + (1− α)tr(U⊺X−12 U)
≤ α‖X−11 ‖(k) + (1− α)‖X−12 ‖(k).
This finishes the proof.
Since the program (4)–(6) is convex, its optimal solution can be approximated in polynomial time within
any given degree of accuracy using the ellipsoid algorithm [GLS81].
4.2 A Special Function
Before we continue, we need to introduce a somewhat complicated function of the singular values of a matrix.
This function will turn out to be the objective funciton in a maximization problem which is dual to (4)–(6).
The next lemma is needed to argue that this function is well-defined. The lemma was proved in [Nik15].
Lemma 4.1.3 ([Nik15]). Let σ1 ≥ . . . σm ≥ 0 be non-negative reals, and let k ≤ m be a positive integer.
There exists a unique integer t, 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, such that
σt >
∑
i>t σi
k − t ≥ σt+1, (7)
with the convention σ0 =∞.
We are now ready to define the function:
Definition 4.1. Let Σ  0 be an m ×m positive semidefinite matrix with singular values σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σm,
and let k ≤ m be a positive integer. The function hk(Σ) is defined as
hk(Σ) ,
t∑
i=1
σ
1/2
i +
√
k − t
(∑
i>t
σi
)1/2
,
where t is the unique integer such that σt >
∑
i>t
σi
k−t ≥ σt+1.
Lemma 4.1.3 guarantees that hk(Σ) is a well-defined real-valued function. In the next lemma we also
show that it is continuous.
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Lemma 4.1.4. The function hk is continuous over positive semidefinite matrices with respect to the operator
norm.
Proof. Let Σ be a m×m positive semidefinite matrix with singular values σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σm and let t, 0 ≤ t < k,
be the unique integer for which σt >
∑
i>t σi
k−t ≥ σt+1. If
∑
i>t σi
k−t > σt+1, then setting δ small enough ensures
that, for any Σ′ such that ‖Σ− Σ′‖2 < δ, hk(Σ) and hk(Σ′) are computed with the same value of t. In this
case, the proof of continuity follows from the continuity of the square root function. Let us therefore assume
that
∑
i>t σi
k−t = σt+1 = . . . = σt′ > σt′+1 for some t
′ ≥ t+ 1. Then for any integer s ∈ [t, t′],
∑
i>s
σi =
∑
i>t
σi − (s− t)σt+1 = (k − s)σt+1.
We then have
t∑
i=1
σ
1/2
i +
√
k − t
(∑
i>t
σi
)1/2
=
t∑
i=1
σ
1/2
i + (k − t)σ1/2t+1
=
s∑
i=1
σ
1/2
i + (k − s)σ1/2t+1
=
s∑
i=1
σ
1/2
i +
√
k − s
(∑
i>s
σi
)1/2
. (8)
For any Σ′ such that ‖Σ′ − Σ‖2 < δ for a small enough δ, we have
hk(Σ
′) =
s∑
i=1
σi(Σ
′)1/2 +
√
k − s
(∑
i>s
σi(Σ
′)
)1/2
,
for some integer s in [t, t′]. Continuity then follows from (8), and the continuity of the square root function.
4.3 The Dual of the Ky Fan Norm Minimization Problem
Our next goal is derive a dual characterization of (4)–(6), which we will then relate to the spectral lower
bound SpecLB(k,A). It is useful to work with the dual, because it is a maximization problem, so to prove
optimality we just need to show that any feasible solution of the dual gives a lower bound on the optimal
error under differential privacy.
The next theorem gives our dual characterization in terms of the special function hk defined in the
previous section.
Theorem 4.2. Let A = (ae)e∈U ∈ RQ×U be a rank |Q| matrix, and let µ be the optimal value of (4)–(6).
Then,
µ2 =maxhk(AQA
⊺)2 s.t. (9)
Q  0, diagonal, tr(Q) = 1 (10)
Since the objective of (4)–(6) is not necessarily differentiable, in order to analyze the dual and prove
Theorem 4.2, we need to recall the concepts of subgradients and subdifferentials. A subgradient of a convex
function f : S → R at x ∈ S, where S is some open subset of Rd, is a vector y ∈ Rd so that for every z ∈ S
we have
f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈z − x, y〉.
The set of subgradients of f at x is denoted ∂f(x) and is known as the subdifferential. When f is differentiable
at x, the subdifferential is a singleton set containing only the gradient ∇f(x). If f is defined by f(x) =
f1(x) + f2(x), where f1, f2 : S → R , then ∂f(x) = ∂f1(x) + ∂f2(x). A basic fact in convex analysis is
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that f achieves its minimum at x if and only if 0 ∈ ∂f(x). For more information on subgradients and
subdifferentials, see the classical text of Rockafellar [Roc70].
Overton and Womersley [OW93] analyzed the subgradients of functions which are a composition of a
differentiable matrix-valued function with a Ky Fan norm. The special case we need also follows from the
results of Lewis [Lew95].
Lemma 4.2.1 ([OW93],[Lew95]). Let gk(X) , ‖X−1‖(k) for a positive definite matrix X ∈ Rm×m. Let
σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σm be the singular values of X−1 and let D be the diagonal matrix with the σi on the diagonal.
Assume that for some r ≥ k, σk = . . . = σr. Then the subgradients of gk are given by
∂gk(X) = conv{−USU⊺SX−2USU⊺S : Uorthonormal, UDU⊺ = X−1, S ⊆ [r]},
where US is the submatrix of U indexed by S.
We use the following well-known characterization of the convex hull of boolean vectors of Hamming
weight k. For a proof, see [Sch03].
Lemma 4.2.2. Let Vk,n , conv{v ∈ {0, 1}n : ‖v‖1 = k}. Then Vk,n = {v : ‖v‖1 = k, 0 ≤ vi ≤ 1 ∀i}.
Before we prove Theorem 4.2, we need one more technical lemma.
Lemma 4.2.3. Let Σ be an m × m positive semidefinite matrix of rank at least k. Then there exists an
m×m positive definite matrix X such that Σ ∈ −∂gk(X), and gk(X) = ‖X−1‖(k) = hk(Σ).
Proof. Let r = rank Σ, and let σ1 ≥ . . . ≥ σr be the non-zero singular values of Σ. Let UDU⊺ = Σ be some
singular value decomposition of Σ: U is an orthonormal matrix and D is a diagonal matrix with the σi on
the diagonal, followed by 0s.
Assume that t, 0 ≤ t < k, is the integer (guaranteed by Lemma 4.1.3) for which σt >
∑
i>t
σi
k−t ≥ σt+1 and
define α ,
∑
i>t
σi
k−t . Since t < k and we assumed Σ has rank at least k, we have α > 0. Define
σ′i ,


σi i ≤ t
α t < i ≤ r
α− ǫ i > r
,
and set D′ be the diagonal matrix with the σ′i on the diagonal. We set ǫ to be an arbitrary number satisfying
α > ǫ > 0. Let us set X , (UD′U⊺)−1/2. By Lemma 4.2.2 and and the choice of t, the vector (σt+1, . . . , σr)
is an element of the polytope αVk−t,r−t. Then Σ is an element of conv{USU⊺SX−2USU⊺S : S = [t] ∪ T, T ⊆
{t + 1, . . . , r}, |T | = k − t}. Since this set is a subset of −∂gk(X), we have Σ ∈ −∂gk(X). A calculation
shows that ‖X−1‖(k) = ‖(UD′U⊺)1/2‖(k) =
∑
i≤t σ
1/2
i + (k − t)α1/2 = hk(Σ). This completes the proof.
of Theorem 4.2. We will use standard notions from the theory of convex duality. For a reference, see the
book by Boyd and Vandenberghe [BV04].
Let us define {X : X ≻ 0} to be the domain for the constraints (6) and the objective function (4).
This makes the constraint X ≻ 0 implicit. The optimization problem is convex by Lemma 4.1.2. Is is also
always feasible: for example for r an upper bound on the Euclidean norm of the longest column of A, 1r I
is a feasible solution. Slater’s condition is therefore satisfied, since the constraints are affine, and, therefore,
strong duality holds.
The Lagrange dual function for (4)–(6) is
g(p) = inf
X≻0
‖X−1‖(k) +
∑
e∈U
pe(a
⊺
eXae − 1),
with dual variables p ∈ RU , p ≥ 0. Equivalently, we can define the diagonal matrix P ∈ RU×U , P  0, with
entries pee = pe, and the dual function becomes
g(P ) = inf
X≻0
‖X−1‖(k) + tr(APA⊺X)− tr(P ) (11)
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Since the terms ‖X−1‖(k) and tr(APA⊺X) are non-negative for any X ≻ 0, g(P ) ≥ −tr(P ) > −∞. There-
fore, the effective domain {P : g(P ) > −∞} of g(P ) is {P : P  0, diagonal}. Since we have strong duality,
µ2 = max{g(P ) : P  0, diagonal}.
By the additivity of subgradients, a matrix X achieves the minimum in (11) if and only if APA⊺ ∈
−∂gk(X), where gk(X) = ‖X−1‖(k). Consider first the case in which APA⊺ has rank at least k. Then, by
Lemma 4.2.3, there exists an X such that APA⊺ ∈ −∂gk(X) and ‖X−1‖(k) = hk(APA⊺). Observe that, if
U is an m× k matrix such that U⊺U = I and tr(U⊺X−1U) = ‖X−1‖(k), then
tr(UU⊺X−2UU⊺X) = tr((U⊺X−2U)(U⊺XU)) = tr(U⊺X−1U) = ‖X−1‖(k).
Since, by Lemma 4.2.1 and APA⊺ ∈ −∂gk(X), APA⊺ is a convex combination of matrices UU⊺X−2UU⊺
with U as above, it follows that tr(APA⊺X) = ‖X−1‖(k). Then we have
g(P ) = ‖X−1‖(k) + tr(APA⊺X)− tr(P )
= 2‖X−1‖(k) − tr(P ) = 2hk(APA⊺)− tr(P ). (12)
If P is such that APA⊺ has rank less than k, we can reduce to the rank k case by a continuity argument.
Fix any non-negative diagonal matrix P and for λ ∈ [0, 1] define P (λ) , λP + (1 − λ)I. For any λ ∈ [0, 1),
AP (λ)A⊺ has rank |Q|, since AA⊺ has rank |Q| by assumption, and, therefore, AP (λ)A⊺  λAA⊺ ≻ 0.
Then, by Corollary 7.5.1. in [Roc70], and (12), we have
g(P ) = lim
λ↑1
g(P (λ)) = lim
λ↑1
[2hk(AP (λ)A
⊺)− λtr(P )− (1− λ)|Q|]
= 2hk(APA
⊺)− tr(P ).
The final equality follows from the continuity of hk, proved in Lemma 4.1.4.
Let us define new variables Q and c, where c = tr(P ) and Q = P/c. Because hk is homogeneous
with exponent 1/2, we can re-write g(P ) as g(P ) = g(Q, c) = 2
√
chk(AQA
⊺) − c. From the first-order
optimality condition ∂g∂c = 0, we see that maximum of g(Q, c) is achieved when c = hk(AQA
⊺)2 and is
equal to hk(AQA
⊺)2. Therefore maximizing g(P ) over diagonal positive semidefinite P is equivalent to the
optimization problem (9)–(10). Since, by strong duality, the maximum of g(P ) is equal to the optimal value
of (4)–(6), this completes the proof.
4.4 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Our strategy will be to use the dual formulation in Theorem 4.2 and the restricted invertibility principle to
give a lower bound on SpecLB(k,A). First we state the restricted invertiblity principle and a consequence
of it proved in [NT15].
Theorem 4.3 ([BT87, SS10]). Let ǫ ∈ (0, 1), let M be an m×n real matrix, and let W be an n×n diagonal
matrix such that W  0 and tr(W ) = 1. For any integer k such that k ≤ ǫ2tr(MWM⊺)/‖MWM⊺‖2 there
exists a subset S ⊆ [n] of size |S| = k such that σmin(MS)2 ≥ (1− ǫ)2tr(MWM⊺).
For the following lemma, which is a consequence of Theorem 4.3, we need to recall the definition of the
trace (nuclear) norm of a matrix M : ‖M‖tr is equal to the sum of singular values of M .
Lemma 4.3.1 ([NT15]). Let M be an m by n real matrix of rank r, and let W  0 be a diagonal ma-
trix such that tr(W ) = 1. Then there exists a submatrix MS of M , |S| ≤ r, such that |S|σmin(MS)2 ≥
c2‖MW 1/2‖2tr/(log r)2, for a universal constant c > 0.
of Theorem 4.1. Given a database size n and a query matrix A, we compute the covariance matrix Σ as
follows. We compute a matrix X which gives an (approximately) optimal solution to (4)–(6) for k , ⌊εn⌋,
and we set Σ , X−1. Since (4)–(6) is a convex optimization problem, it can be solved in time polynomial
in |Q| to any degree of accuracy using the ellipsoid algorithm [GLS81] (or the algorithm of Overton and
Womersley [OW93]). By Lemma 3.0.2 and the constraints (6), MprojΣ is (ε, δ)-differentially private with this
choice of Σ.
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By Lemma 3.0.2,
err(MprojΣ , n, A) = O
((
1 +
√
log |U |√
log 1/δ
)1/2)
· cε,δ√|Q|‖Σ‖(k). (13)
By Theorem 4.2, the optimal solution Q of (9)–(10) satisfies
‖Σ‖(k) = hk(AQA⊺) =
t∑
i=1
λ
1/2
i +
√
k − t
(∑
i>t
λi
)1/2
,
where λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λm are the eigenvalues of AQA⊺ and t, 0 ≤ t < k, is an integer such that (k − t)λt >∑
i>t λi ≥ (k − t)λt+1. At least one of
∑t
i=1 λ
1/2
i and
√
k − t (∑i>t λi)1/2 must be bounded from below by
1
2‖Σ‖(k). Next we consider these two cases separately.
Assume first that
∑t
i=1 λ
1/2
i ≥ 12‖Σ‖(k). Let Π be the orthogonal projection operator onto the eigenspace
of AQA⊺ corresponding to λ1, . . . , λt. Then, because λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λt are the nonzero singular values of
ΠAQ1/2, we have ‖ΠAQ1/2‖tr =
∑t
i=1 λ
1/2
i ≥ 12‖Σ‖(k). By Lemma 4.3.1 applied to the matrices M = ΠA
and W = Q, there exists a set S ⊆ U of size at most |S| ≤ rank ΠA = t < εn, such that
SpecLB(εn,A) ≥
√
|S|
|Q| λmin(AS)
≥
√
|S|
|Q| λmin(ΠAS) ≥
c‖ΠAQ1/2‖tr
(log εn)
√
|Q| ≥
c‖Σ‖(k)
2(log εn)
√
|Q| (14)
for an absolute constant c.
For the second case, assume that
√
k − t (∑i>t λi)1/2 ≥ 12‖Σ‖(k). Let Π now be an orthogonal projection
operator onto the eigenspace of AQA⊺ corresponding to λt+1, . . . , λm. By the choice of t, we have
tr(ΠAQAΠ)
‖ΠAQAΠ‖2 =
∑
i>t λi
λt+1
≥ k − t.
By Theorem 4.3, applied withM = ΠA,W = Q, and ε = 12 , there exists a set S ⊆ U of size 14 (k−t) < k ≤ εn
so that
SpecLB2(εn,A) ≥
√
|S|
|Q|λmin(AS)
≥
√
|S|
|Q|λmin(ΠAS) ≥
√
k − t (∑i>t λi)1/2
4
√|Q| ≥
‖Σ‖(k)
8
√|Q| . (15)
The theorem follows from (13), the fact that at least one of (14) or (15) holds, and Theorem 2.1.
5 Conclusion
Several natural problems remain open. Probably the most important one is to prove results analogous to
ours for worst case, rather than average, error. In that case the simple post-processing strategy of the
projection mechanism will likely not be sufficient. Another interesting problem is to remove the dependence
on the universe size in the competetiveness ratio. It is plausible that this can be done with the projection
mechanism and a well-chosen Gaussian noise distribution, but we would need tighter lower bounds, possibly
based on fingerprinting codes as in [BUV13].
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